Near the end of the dot-com bubble in 2000, my business partner and I stumbled onto the notion that the techs were acting much like a gold rush. Gold was being found in the dot-com world and creating riches, but its passion was producing ever more gold miners with golden dreams.
Our company had traversed the dot-com craze during the late 1990s, chasing the gold like everyone else. But in early 2000, our valuation models simply could not justify the tech prices . . . not by a mile.
A simple truth spoke to us: Never in the history of the US stock markets had an industry grown fast enough, long enough, to justify the prices of most tech and big consumer stocks.
We decided to cut back on the hottest of the highflyers. It changed our company and our lives forever.
This seemingly bold move was not based on something we were convinced we knew, but just the opposite. It was because we knew we did not know how to value the techs, and that being the case, we decided to stand aside. Even then, there was nothing bold about our decision to start cutting back on techs. In fact, we visited every client we had and admitted to them we believed the techs had reached the gold-rush state, but they might just keep going higher like they had over the last decade. The only thing we could say for sure was that our valuation models showed that many slower-growing companies were great values. We advised them we recommended placing sell orders 15% below the current prices on the six most overvalued tech stocks. Should any of these sell orders be triggered, we would invest the proceeds in undervalued dividend-paying stocks with dominant positions in their industries.
During the year 2000, all six of the stocks' sell orders were triggered, and we bought financials, consumer staples, and industrial companies whose prices had gone flat in recent years because their sales and earnings were growing in the high single digits, much less than the 25-50% annual earnings growth of the techs. Interestingly, these undervalued dividend-paying stocks actually rose in 2000 when the overall market fell by over 10% and the dot-com gold rush ended.
Why am I sharing this old tale? Am I predicting the AI gold rush is near its end? Indeed, are there other stocks that offer much better value with good prospects for future growth? No I’m not. I am announcing; however, that the gold rush in AI is now a reality and there are two truisms about gold rushes of the past. 1) When everyone, everywhere knows that an industry or a particular stock is the center of the investing universe, there is a good chance that everyone owns the stocks and the new money needed to push the stock higher will soon be tapped out. 2) The analysis at the end of gold rushes has always revealed that the companies that sold the picks and shovels for the miners were the best place to put your money, not in the gold miners themselves.
As one who is old enough to remember the dot-com collapse, my reason for writing this blog is to just give everyone a heads up that in my judgment, the AI phenomenon has officially reached the gold rush state. I said last time, my valuation models are showing that an S&P 500 level of 5700 is reasonable. If the AI world can produce overall sales and earning growth for corporate America of 11-12% over the next five years, the market is fairly priced. If earnings growth is higher than that, stocks still have a good run ahead of them. However, if the earnings growth falls back to a 7% or 8% handle, stocks will fall. Additionally, I do not see a long list of undervalued non-AI companies. Thus, I conclude the gold rush has room to run. I’ll keep you posted on what my models are saying as we go.
If you would like to communicate with me directly, email me at info@gregdonaldson.com
